Get rid of those dangerous liquids!

Airport madness....

I've known several people who've had the misfortune to have to fly since the "liquid bomb" plot was "foiled" in the UK.

I await real proof, in the form of criminal charges followed by convictions in an open court of law, before I believe there really was a plot. In the meantime, I'm scheduled to fly from Ireland to California in October and I'm desperately hoping the airline security madness has abated by then. Otherwise, I don't know how I'll manage such a long flight without my iPod! Not to mention, leave my laptop at home?!

The measures being taken--banning bottled water, confiscating mascara, and handcuffing panicky sexagenarians for trying to take a Pepsi to the loo--are truly ridiculous. Do they honestly believe terrorists are too stupid to switch tactics, and simply plant a more conventional device in the relatively unscreened checked luggage on domestic American flights? Or target a totally different vulnerability, such as subways, ports, or sports events?

Salon author, Patrick (“Ask the Pilot” ) Smith has written a couple of outstanding columns since the latest worldwide airport fiasco. This one, in which he refers to a "liquid bomb" plot foiled in 1995, is from today’s Salon:

..."We can't keep weapons out of prisons. How can we hope to keep them out of airports?" poses Bruce Schneier, a prominent security expert and the author of "Beyond Fear."

Eleven years ago we were sensible enough to accept this -- and it's not as if terrorism was something new, with the Lockerbie bombing and '93 World Trade Center attack still fresh in our minds. Lo and behold, no American planes were bombed with liquid explosives -- or any other kind -- in the interim. The true nuts and bolts of keeping terrorists away from planes, meanwhile, was going on out of view -- the responsibility of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, not part-time screeners at the airport. Numerous intelligence failures were brought to bear on Sept. 11, certainly, but unfortunately our initial reaction was to scapegoat airport security, whose role in the attacks was all but irrelevant. At the time, box cutters were not prohibited items. If they had been, the hijackers would have fashioned some other weapon.

[Snip]

Real security isn't glamorous. It doesn't result in splashy news stories and footage of stranded travelers sleeping on terminal floors. And every penny spent confiscating mascara is a penny that could be spent elsewhere in the security hierarchy. The key is getting the most bang for your security buck, and you're not getting a whole lot of bang -- and you're losing a whole lot of bucks -- with yet another clampdown on this or that dangerous item du jour.

"Exactly two things have improved airplane security since 9/11," Schneier says. "Reinforcing the cockpit door and teaching passengers that they need to fight back. Everything else has largely been a waste of money."

Complete column here (requires subscription or obligatory ad).